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Abstract
This essay explores the creation of the Metro-North Railroad in 1983 as a public agency
to provide commuter train services on the New York–New Haven Line. The essay begins by
bringing out the central role commuter rail services played in the negotiations over the New
Haven Railroad’s bankruptcy in the 1960s. I argue that New Haven Line’s near liquidation
during the bankruptcy prompted advocacy from commuters, urban planners, and politicians that
pushed back against the trend towards automobile-centric urban transportation planning. In the
next section, I use the New Haven Line’s subsequent operation in the 1970s under subsidy
arrangements with another private railroad and a federally-run carrier to show that indirect
subsidy did little to improve conditions since freight railroads—public or private—did not care
about investing in commuter services, which did little to help their bottom line. Lastly, I argue
that Metro-North succeeded in the 1980s at improving the railroad’s services because it effected
the long overdue separation of commuter services from freight and intercity trains, which
allowed for greater local control, customer-first management, and renegotiation of subsidies and
labor rules. I go on to conclude that, despite its successes, the New Haven Line’s vital
implication in interests ranging from the lives of individual commuters to the national economy
has ironically hampered its progress as municipalities, the states of New York and Connecticut,
and the federal government have failed to cooperate and adequately fund continued progress.
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Introduction
“I have always taken the position that the maintenance of essential commuter rail service
is a governmental responsibility when private industry cannot perform this function. I now
reiterate that belief,” testified Robert Wagner, Mayor of New York City, to the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) in April 1965.1 Wagner’s statement accompanied those of New
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and commuter representatives in a show of force against the
bankrupt New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad (colloquially known as “the New
Haven”). The railroad had applied to the ICC for permission to severely curtail commuter
services along the New Haven Line in an effort to improve its finances. Governor Rockefeller
had reminded the Commission the day before that “rail commutation in the New York
metropolitan area is not a luxury but an absolute essential [sic] to the economic well-being of the
City of New York, the nation’s business and commercial capital, and to the surrounding
suburban areas.”2
Rockefeller and Wagner’s testimonies and actions helped force the bankrupt railroad to
temporarily keep the New Haven’s commuter line afloat. But could they save the New Haven
Line? Would “governmental responsibility” step in to aid commuters where private industry did
not? The New Haven Line presents an ideal case study for America’s big-city commuter
railroads in the latter half of the twentieth century. Its story exposes the decline faced by these
services in the hands of ailing private railroads that desperately wanted to exit the passenger

Robert F. Wagner, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed Discontinuances and Changes of Passenger Train Service
Operated to and from New York City” (Interstate Commerce Commission, April 29, 1965), Box 44, New York,
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Collection, Archives & Special Collections at the Thomas J. Dodd Research
Center, University of Connecticut Libraries (“NHRR Archive”).
2
Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed Discontinuances and Changes of Passenger Train
Service Operated to and from New York City” (Interstate Commerce Commission, April 28, 1965), 2, Box 44,
NHRR Archive.
1
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business, and the ways in which the federal government and the states ultimately provided more
direct subsidies to keep them alive. The eventual creation of Metro-North (a division of New
York State’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority) to run the New Haven Line represented a
seizure of control both from the federal government, which had provided poor service running
the line during the 1970s, and the private sector, which had sought to discontinue commuter
service altogether and deferred maintenance to disastrous effect in the 1960s and before. MetroNorth’s joint service of two states has brought out the challenges of coordinating regional
interests between states under American federalism.
American commuter rail is heavily under-studied. There are no books that focus on
American commuter rail in the latter half of the 20th century. All the major railroads in the 1960s
thought of themselves as freight carriers saddled with a government obligation to carry
passengers, and railroad scholarship generally reflects this emphasis on freight. Even among
works focused on passenger transportation, commuter rail often merits little more than a passing
mention, as it carries neither the romance and tragedy of the decline of intercity trains nor the
erstwhile urban relevance—even to tourists—and iconic status of better-known public transit
systems like subways and buses. Commuter rail service was traditionally provided by many of
the same railroads that ran intercity services, with the New Haven Railroad as a prime example.
One of the achievements won in the creation of Metro-North and similar systems around the
country was recognition of commuter rail’s greater kinship with municipal public transit than
with intercity travel, allowing it to receive higher levels of subsidy, share operations with other
transit under a central commuter authority, and focus on the experiences and desires of riders
without the threat of stripping back service in pursuit of profit.

2

In this paper, I will argue that the plight of the New Haven railroad and its thousands of
daily passengers helped bring about a shift in mindset among policymakers and taxpayers about
the nature and necessity of railroad commuting. Private railroads hamstrung by outmoded
antitrust regulation sought to axe essential public services in a drive for financial gain. The real
threat of canceled service prompted the public to take on the burden of operating commuter rail
in the name of the benefits it provided the city as an alternative to destructive and wildly
expensive automobile infrastructure and the unpalatable prospect of sitting in traffic. Nascent
environmental concerns also played into the public’s valuation of rail commutation, at first in the
name of curbing pollution and then, in the 1970s, as an economical response to the energy crises.
By creating the Metro-North, the states of New York and Connecticut acknowledged the reality
that commuter rail service held much more in common with urban mass transportation like buses
and subways than it did with freight trains and followed the example of the local public takeover
of these services that had taken place across U.S. cities earlier in the 20th century. That the
Metro-North has experienced such a dramatic turnaround reflects the motivation of local
governments to keep up and improve essential public services like transportation for the larger
benefits they provide for quality of life and the regional economy, even if commuter rail itself is
not directly profitable.

The more than twenty-year process that led from the 1961 bankruptcy of the New Haven
to the 1983 creation of the Metro-North proved excruciating for riders. The New Haven Line was
passed first from the New Haven Railroad to Penn Central in a 1968 merger of northeastern
railroads and then to Conrail, a federal carrier Congress created to take over from the bankrupt
Penn Central in 1976. The New Haven and Penn Central deferred essential maintenance on
passenger equipment, hoping both to save money and discourage ridership and to prove to the
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Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that these lines were unnecessary and eligible for
termination.3 Notices announcing that commuter service would be canceled entirely and
imminently (pending court approval, which never came) were posted multiple times in stations
along the line, forcing riders to plan alternate ways to get to and from Manhattan. In 1980, fewer
than three quarters of trains were on time.4 As such, the takeover of the Conrail commuter lines
by the MTA was met with cautious optimism: a New York Times editorial to “welcome” the
railroad mused that “having no freight division, it may be better able to remember that its cargo
is people.”5
The preservation of the New Haven Line aimed to preserve a way of life—and an
economic lifeline. New York’s density and economic prosperity had climbed steadily since the
line first served wealthy suburban commuters in the 1800s. Many of Manhattan’s professionals
continued to live in Westchester and Fairfield Counties to raise families away from the bustle of
the city. Though these families probably all owned private automobiles by the 1960s, commuters
continued to rely on rail travel to bypass automobile traffic, make use of the ride to read a
newspaper or catch up on work, and avoid the hassle and expense of parking in New York City.
Academic and think tank studies from the 1960s repeatedly emphasized what was at stake in
saving suburban rail transit: eliminating commuter trains would require constructing impossibly
large expressways and new parking garages that would cost well more than subsidizing rail
service. Additional automobile infrastructure would also be a blight on the city and the suburbs

William D. Middleton, “How Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First Rate in a Decade,” in North American
Commuter Rail 1994 (Pasadena, CA: Pentrex, 1994), 8.
4
Christopher T. Baer, “A General Chronology of the Successors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and Their
Historical Context, 1980–1989” (Pennsylvania Railroad Technical and Historical Society, April 2015), 1,
http://www.prrths.com/newprr_files/Hagley/PRR1980.pdf.
5
New York Times Editorial Board, “New Neighbors, New Management: Railroad Switch,” New York Times,
January 4, 1983.
3
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and increase air pollution.6 The ICC and state policymakers pushing subsidies for commuter rail
would cite such regional planning thinking as they sought to establish the public interest in
perpetuating commuter rail service alongside other urban mass transit. While private railroads
sought to eliminate all passenger service in a perennial effort to turn a profit, the ICC and state
subsidy efforts prevented the death of commuter rail on the New Haven Line.
Saving commuter rail was not a foregone conclusion. One needs only to look at the
streetcar, an immensely popular form of public transportation in the early 20th century which was
completely removed by local authorities across the country by the end of the 1960s. Automobile
interests and many planners promoted diesel buses, which integrated more easily with car traffic
on both urban streets and highways and were cheaper to maintain than streetcars and their tracks,
which by that point seemed like relics of a bygone era.7 Postwar low-density suburban housing,
subsidized by the government, was designed with the automobile in mind, sprawling out in a
manner difficult to serve with linear transit. 8 While New York’s subway was guaranteed a future
through public ownership under the stewardship of Mayor Fiorello La Guardia in 1940,
privately-owned streetcar lines were left to founder as the United States embraced its automotive
future.9
In the end, political inertia seems to have played a role in the continuance of the New
Haven Line. Commuters were adamant about the necessity of train service, but New York and
Connecticut never leaped at the opportunity to run it and took it over only when the Reagan

See, for example, Leonard Lund, “The Commuter Problem in the New York Area: A Consideration of Past Efforts
and a Proposed Solution for the Present Problem” (New York University, 1962).
7
Brian Ladd, Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automotive Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 132.
It didn’t help that private transit companies that ran streetcar lines were viewed as predatory land speculators,
making individual automobile ownership seem liberating by comparison.
8
Mark S. Foster, From Streetcar to Superhighway: American City Planners and Urban Transportation, 1900-1940,
Technology and Urban Growth (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 178–9.
9
Taras Grescoe, Straphanger: Saving Our Cities and Ourselves from the Automobile (New York: Times Books,
2012), 58.
6
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administration mandated that the states relieve Conrail of its beleaguered commuter services.
The MTA gained increasing control over the New Haven Line as it began to administer subsidies
and coordinate operations in the 1970s. Though the gradual nature of the transition from private
to public ownership beleaguered riders, it allowed the agency to gain experience with commuter
rail operations such that the final handover in 1983 was relatively smooth.
In its first ten years, the Metro-North garnered respect for its improved on-time
performance and equipment. Ridership also jumped 20% from the Conrail days by 1990.10 By
2013, the railroad had fully doubled its ridership and received an international prize for railroad
design.11 I attribute this turnaround to the railroad’s state control under the MTA, which brought
customer-oriented, experienced management to the former Conrail lines. With the railroad no
longer in private hands, New York and Connecticut were directly responsible for the quality of
operations, and through Metro-North they collectively undertook a series of modernization
efforts and innovative approaches to expanding service that would have been impossible to
imagine under the freight railroads, which were not interested in investing capital in an operation
that seemed hopelessly unprofitable.
Despite these strides, the New Haven Line’s difficulties both before and after its takeover
by Metro-North illuminate struggles with metropolitan regional transportation policy in the
United States. The federal government has retained a hands-off approach to commuter rail since
the Reagan Era despite its interstate nature and consequences for the national economy. 12 The
New Haven Line’s joint service to New York and Connecticut has resulted in a lack of funding
“A New President For Metro-North,” The New York Times, April 5, 1991, sec. N.Y. / Region,
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/05/nyregion/metro-datelines-a-new-president-for-metro-north.html.
11
MTA, “MTA Metro-North Railroad Turns 30 Today: From Worst to Best in Three Decades,” January 1, 2013,
http://www.mta.info/press-release/metro-north/mta-metro-north-railroad-turns-30-today.
12
Federal interaction with Metro-North today mostly takes the form of conflicts between it and Amtrak over funding
improvements and managing operations on the New Haven Line, with overlaps with Amtrak’s marquee Northeast
Corridor service between Washington, DC and Boston.
10
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as policymakers in each state point to the other as underpaying. Although the railroad’s operation
centers on New York City, the city itself plays a minimal role in funding and operating the
railroad. I place responsibility for Metro-North’s web of insufficient subsidies on the collective
action problem posed by American federalism. Metro-North’s huge range of stakeholders
ranging from the local to the federal has begotten perennial finger-pointing leading to stagnation.
While the states’ formation of a public agency to run the New Haven Line was a step in the right
direction, the federal government and the states Metro-North serves have failed to provide
unified policy towards and sufficient support for essential commuter rail service for one of our
nation’s largest metropolises.

7

The Death of the New Haven and the Birth of Penn Central
Eastern Railroads and the Commuter Problem
Railroad commuting, which allowed bankers, lawyers, and other upper- and uppermiddle-class professionals to reside in the suburbs while working day jobs downtown, spurred
the concurrent growth of Manhattan into a uniquely dense American economic nerve center and
the development of affluent residential communities in Westchester and Fairfield Counties. In
the 1960s, this way of life—which had close parallels in a few of the United States’ largest
cities—came under threat as the New Haven entered into bankruptcy, due in part to the losses it
incurred providing commuter service. 13 While railroads such as the New Haven would cite the
obligation of providing passenger services as a principal reason for their financial insolvency, the
reality was that competition from new technologies challenged both the freight and passenger
businesses in the prosperous postwar years. Furthermore, the New Haven and other railroads
were fond of lumping commuter and intercity trains together in their cost accounting, a practice
which belied the vast differences between the two and nearly brought the end of essential
commuter rail service to New York as the New Haven sought to erase its passenger deficit.
While American railroads enjoyed heavy traffic during World War II, postwar investment
in motor vehicle and aviation infrastructure threatened all forms of railroad business. During
World War II, American railroads thrived. Passenger ridership soared due to gasoline
restrictions, and freight use exploded with the intense demands of the industry. Heavy railroad
utilization during the war took a heavy toll on railroad equipment and physical plant as
13

In the largest U.S. cities, a wide range of major railroads provided commuter service on their lines. For example,
New York City was served by the New Haven Railroad from Connecticut, the New York Central Railroad from
Westchester, the Long Island Railroad, and the Pennsylvania and Erie Lackawanna Railroads from New Jersey.
Boston was served by the Boston and Maine Railroad from the north, the New York Central from the west, and the
New Haven from the south. Philadelphia was served by the Pennsylvania and Reading railroads. Chicago was
served by the Alton, Burlington Northern, Chicago and North Western, Illinois Central, Milwaukee, Norfolk and
Western, and Rock Island railroads, among others.

9

maintenance was deferred until peacetime. 14 Unfortunately for the railroads, the postwar years
brought a steady decline in both freight and passenger miles despite the United States’ economic
prosperity as millions of Americans with disposable incomes pursued the dream of cardependent home ownership in auto-centric, sprawling suburbia. Long-distance passenger trains,
once the pinnacle of domestic luxury travel, were gradually supplanted by increasingly safe, fast,
and affordable (thanks to government subsidy) air traffic and automobile road trips.15 Truckers
simultaneously poached shipping from the railroads as states and the federal government built
out the national road network. President Eisenhower’s 1956 National Interstate and Defense
Highways Act, which provided a 90% federal subsidy for states to build out a network of gradeseparated, limited access highways ideal for high-speed automobile travel, accelerated the
diversion of freight traffic to truckers (who now could boast delivery times comparable to the
railroads, even over long distances) and intercity and commuter travel to private cars (which
provided convenient, expedient door-to-door service).16
The railroads hit hardest by the changing economics of transportation were the eastern
carriers. Western long-haul railroads like the Union Pacific benefitted from superior speed and
lower cost achieved over long distances. They also carried mostly raw materials and foodstuffs
that were well-suited to the heavy haul capacities of freight trains. Lastly, western and southern
railroads could serve emerging markets in the Sun Belt. 17 Eastern railroads operated on a raw

14

Maury Klein, Unfinished Business: The Railroad in American Life (Hanover, NH: University Press of New
England, 1994), 160.
15
Richard Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970 (DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois University
Press, 2001), 106–8, provides a concise summary of the ways the government subsidized auto and air travel in the
postwar years.
16
Donald M. Itzkoff, Off the Track: The Decline of the Intercity Passenger Train in the United States, Contributions
in Economics and Economic History 62 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 28–9; see also Ladd, Autophobia,
100.
17
Robert B. Carson, Main Line to Oblivion: The Disintegration of New York Railroads in the Twentieth Century,
National University Publications: Series in American Studies (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971), 151–2.
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materials-in, finished goods-out model that was becoming increasingly outmoded as
manufacturing declined in cities like New Haven after the war. Whatever freight service that was
left for them to provide was highly susceptible to truck competition due to the shorter distances
involved.
The New Haven was a symptomatic eastern railroad, and its high commuter volume
prompted it to look past its declining freight revenues to blame passengers, and commuters in
particular, for its financial woes. The New Haven and the Long Island Railroad carried the
highest proportions of passenger to freight traffic in the nation, with a large volume of
commuters. Commuters, so-called for the “commuted” prices they paid on their monthly tickets,
were in some ways a particular financial drain for the railroad.18 They concentrated heavy
passenger traffic into approximately four hours of the day, requiring tight timetables and many
trains to accommodate weekday rushes to and from the city. For the rest of the day, a large
portion of the equipment and the people that ran it sat idle. Nevertheless, the railroads hired
commuter conductors for full days of work, meaning that they were paid for eight hours, plus
four of overtime, despite working on trains for just four.19 Similarly, commuter trains either had
to be stored in Grand Central Terminal, where storage capacity was extraordinarily expensive, or
“deadheaded” (moved without customers) to a more spacious suburban yard. Thus the low

18

The degree to which commuter trains were a financial drain was subject to a fair amount of debate. The railroads
over-exaggerated the deficit incurred in providing the service, while some commuter rail advocates and
policymakers went as far as to argue that commuter rail in fact posed no deficit whatsoever. See James C. Nelson,
Railroad Transportation and Public Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1959), 284–9, 309–13, for a
discussion of how railroads and the ICC estimated the financial burden of passenger service given the many
overlapping costs with freight service. In stark contrast to the New Haven’s claims of heavy deficits incurred by
commuter service, Governor Rockefeller argued in his 1965 court appearance that expert witnesses showed that
those services “operated at or near the break even point” (Rockefeller, “Testimony in Relation to Proposed
Discontinuances,” 3).
19
George W. Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” Business History Review 36, no. 2 (1962): 174,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3111454.
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utilization of equipment, which represented a fixed capital cost for the railroad, contributed to a
high expense ratio for operating commuter rail. 20
Commuter rail was also subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), which had controlled rates and services for railroad freight since its establishment in
1887. Congress gave the ICC control over passenger services in 1958 to provide a mechanism
for railroads to drop highly under-used and unprofitable branch lines, which local politicians had
forced them to preserve. The ICC evaluated these abandonments on a case-by-case basis and
granted them if they determined that they were “not required by public convenience or necessity
and were therefore a burden on interstate commerce.”21 The ICC’s rate controls meant that the
New Haven and other suburban railroads could not easily raise fares on commuters. As a result,
the financial deficit of operating commuter rail deepened.22 By preventing large-scale service
abandonments and fare hikes, the ICC’s regulation constrained the railroads from streamlining
their services in response to increased competition in the postwar era. As a result, the fiscal woes
of Eastern railroads like the New Haven quickly multiplied, and they could do little to cut back
in response. The ICC presciently treated commuter rail as a public service worthy of protection.
But government, federal and local, had so far failed to provide accompanying public funds in
recognition of the ICC’s approach, which caused the railroads to under-invest in, and attempt to
cancel, commuter rail service in pursuit of financial stability.

J. W. Swanberg, North American Commuter Rail 1994: Including a Detailed User’s Guide for Every System in
the U.S. and Canada, ed. William D. Middleton (Pasadena, CA: Pentrex, 1994), 2.
21
Saunders, Merging Lines, 245.
22
Lawrence Grow, On the 8:02: An Informal History of Commuting by Rail in America (New York: Mayflower
Books, 1979), 17. Despite the perennial protestations of commuters over fares, the price per mile of commuter
service actually fell from 2.5 cents at the beginning of the century to 1 cent in 1930. Grow reminds us that “whether
it was known or not, even the broken-down service of the postwar period was a true bargain.”
20
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Planners’ Responses to Commuter Deficits
Urban planners grappling with the implications of the automobile on urban transportation
in the 1960s backed up the ICC’s conviction that commuter rail was an essential regional service,
which helped convince the governments of New York and Connecticut to take steps toward
public funding and control of commuter rail. Planners coupled the vivid imagery of downtown
destruction for parking lots and freeways with studies on the economic and logistical
impracticalities of transporting Manhattan’s huge commuter population by motor vehicle to
convince policymakers that saving commuter rail was in the public interest.
Planners persuasively argued that a wholesale shift to automobile commuting
infrastructure would be prohibitively expensive and disastrous to New York’s built environment.
In 1961, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) prepared a report for the Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee that outlined the crisis of commuter transportation in New York
City’s Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York suburbs. In its recommendations, the RPA noted
that half of the 400,000 people working in New York’s central business district took commuter
rail to work and argued that the cost to transition these commuters to automobiles and buses
would be “enormous.” State and local governments would have to build new expressways and
bridges, handle increased downtown traffic, and repurpose high-value land for parking.23 The
RPA boiled the commuter railroads’ problems down to the poor condition of equipment and
troubled finances, which it attributed to a cycle of reduced ridership and corresponding
insufficient maintenance due to reduced revenues. Both the RPA and a 1962 report in Business

“Commuter Transportation: A Study of Passenger Transportation in the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut
Metropolitan Region with Particular Reference to Railroad Commutation,” Prepared for the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce of the United States Senate (Regional Plan Association, January 31, 1961), 3–4.
23
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History Review by University of California, Berkley business professor George Hilton noted that
most of the reduction in ridership that began this cycle occurred in the off-peak periods:
The rise of suburban shopping centers has drastically altered habits of suburban
housewives, whose trips to the downtown area for shopping were once the
principal source of off-hour revenue for commuter trains. Similarly, television
reduced ridership in evening hours by removing much of the theater traffic.
Adoption of the five-day week in the postwar period cost the railroads one day's
commuter traffic.24
The RPA and Hilton differed on how the federal government should respond to the
commuter rail crisis. The RPA emphasized Manhattan’s role as the “nerve center of the nation’s
economy,” the federal government’s status as one of the region’s largest employers, and public
safety concerns as reasons that the federal government should provide capital funds to
rehabilitate and buy new commuter rail equipment and facilities, fund equipment research, and
repeal the federal passenger fares tax.25 The RPA did not suggest that Congress subsidize any
continuing losses from commuter rail service after its emergency modernization, and instead
suggested that state and local budgets take up this burden, as well as cancel property taxes on
commuter railroads, in exchange for the responsibility to set service standards and locations. 26
Though downplayed by the RPA in its emphasis on the possibilities created by system
modernization, even the best-kept commuter railroads could not turn a profit, and the states
would inevitably be required to cover what had become substantial operating deficits.
In his analysis, Hilton diverged from the RPA’s preservationist approach and argued that
commuter rail was destined to die and should not be subsidized. He saw the contribution of
automotive traffic to downtown congestion as an argument to embrace urban sprawl and

Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” 173–4.
“Commuter Transportation,” 6–7.
26
“Commuter Transportation,” 7. By arguing for federal capital grants instead of continuing subsidies, the RPA
played to Congress’s distaste for nationalization and mirrored the recently approved Highway Act of 1956.
24
25
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decentralization, rather than propping up the outmoded radial commuter model. “The city of the
future,” he wrote, “is likely to have the general characteristics of Los Angeles: an atrophied
center, identifiable but no longer of great significance, surrounded by a great admixture of
residential, manufacturing, and commercial areas.”27 Though Hilton’s view fit with the popular
conception at the time that railroads were a transportation mode of the past to be supplanted by
cars and may have been well-suited to midwestern and western cities like Los Angeles, it did not
accommodate eastern metropolises like New York, which were already heavily urbanized and
had little room for expansion. As the RPA convincingly argued, the federal government could
not simply stand by and let New York “atrophy” at the hand of traffic congestion were the
commuter railroads to cease their service. Planners repositioned commuter rail as an essential
and cost-effective municipal transportation service rather than an outdated technology, which
provided politically advantageous economic justifications for public subsidies to perpetuate
commuter rail.
The New Haven Goes Bankrupt
By the 1960s, the New Haven was in dire financial circumstances, and commuter
services bore the brunt of its troubles. Since the war its commuter trains had gained a reputation
for being “notoriously cold, dirty, and late,” which certainly did not help attract additional
passengers.28 The railroad was hit hard by a hurricane and flooding in 1955, which exacerbated
equipment problems and the maintenance deficit. The New Haven’s bankruptcy became all but
assured with the construction of the Connecticut Turnpike, today Interstate 95, which paralleled

27
28

Hilton, “The Decline of Railroad Commutation,” 186–7.
Saunders, Merging Lines, 247.
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the route of the railroad and drew away both passenger and freight traffic. The earlier Merritt
Parkway, which followed a parallel route inland, did not permit commercial traffic. 29
The New Haven’s bankruptcy in 1961 forced the states to decide whether commuter rail
was worth saving. The railroad’s new court-appointed trustees, realizing they had inherited a
doomed railroad, quickly pivoted to three measures to bring solvency: maximization of state and
federal assistance in the short-term, discontinuance of unprofitable passenger service to any
extent possible, and inclusion in the slowly germinating merger of the two largest eastern
railroads, the Pennsylvania and its archrival, the New York Central.
As early as 1960, the railroad had reported to the ICC that passenger service deficits were
the cause of its financial woes. In a petition to the Commission to request approval for a
passenger fare increase, the New Haven argued that its “lavish taxation,” as compared to the
“vast subsidies” issued by the federal government for highway and airport facilities, had
increased the competition for long-distance travel and accordingly reduced its customer base,
necessitating the requested fare hike.30 Interestingly, despite its knowledge of the heavy deficits
associated specifically with commuting and its imminent requests to discontinue all passenger
service, the New Haven itself laid out the case for the preservation of commuter services, much
in the same way the RPA would in its report a year later:
Commuter service by rail is also essential because the abandonment of such
service would result in chaotic traffic congestion in the metropolitan areas and
any attempt to substitute adequate highways to provide for the transportation of
the rail commuters would run into astronomical figures.31
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This statement may have been an effort by the railroad to appear reasonable to policymakers and
regulators evaluating the possibility of alleviating the New Haven of its commuter service
burden. Even so, the New Haven’s advocacy for the continuance of commuter trains by another
entity despite its interest in their cancellation is indicative of the degree to which alternatives
such as highway service did not appear realistic to those intimately familiar with the heavy
traffic managed by commuter rail.
Residents of Connecticut and New York dependent on the line realized that the New
Haven’s bankruptcy put commuter services in jeopardy and spoke out for the preservation of the
New Haven Line. In a hearing at the U.S. District Court of Connecticut, which presided over the
New Haven’s reorganization proceedings, trustee Richard Joyce Smith expressed the railroad’s
intention to discontinue passenger service absent public support.32 Herbert Baldwin, First
Selectman of Westport, spoke in favor of the provision of such funds, noting that a third of
Westport’s 20,000 residents relied on service to New York City for their livelihoods. Calling the
prospect of discontinuation “catastrophic” to Westport with a “similar situation” in other
Fairfield County towns, Baldwin argued that disrupting passenger service on the New Haven
“would have a serious effect upon the economy of the entire state.” 33 Baldwin’s testimony
showed the degree to which New Haven riders viewed its service as the only viable way to
commute to New York, and his broad-reaching economic arguments illuminated the municipal
and regional stakes of curtailing train service.
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Despite advocacy from both the railroad’s trustees and the riders themselves for
government assistance to perpetuate commuter service, the states were slow to act. The
Connecticut legislature created the Connecticut Transportation Authority (CTA) in 1963 to
administer subsidies to the New Haven, but New York dragged its feet.34 Meanwhile, the federal
government refused to consider contributing to subsidizing the New Haven’s commuter service
until the states each made substantial contributions. 35 Though New York and Connecticut would
eventually agree in 1965 to jointly fund commuter service in 1965, the four years of circular
finger-pointing prompted the New Haven to take direct action to cancel commuter service.
In February 1965, the trustees notified the ICC of its desire to discontinue all passenger
service. The government was in a bind, because the courts that presided over the bankruptcy
reorganization proceedings could not compel the railroad to continue to operate a money-losing
service, given the company’s obligations to its shareholders. At the same time, the ICC alongside
local and state authorities strongly opposed passenger discontinuance except in the cases of
particularly underutilized branch lines that were deemed outside of the public necessity. In a
decision of the District Court of Connecticut on February 15, Judge Robert Anderson affirmed
that the New Haven ought to be allowed to make such a request, writing that the evidence in
favor of pursuing discontinuance was “devastating and overwhelming. It stands completely
uncontradicted.”36 Anderson made the case that although the New Haven’s status as a public
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utility meant that the public interest weighed in considering its continued operation, court
precedent established firmly that the public interest (in favor of continued passenger service)
must be balanced against a fiduciary duty to shareholders and creditors:
There are strict limits to the extent to which, in reorganization proceedings, the
interests of creditors… may be sacrificed to the public interest; to exceed those
limits is (to say the least) to come dangerously close to the edge of
unconstitutional taking of property, a line from which courts should keep away if
possible.37
Anderson went on to condemn the states for the insufficient stopgap measures they had taken up
to that point and emphatically declared that they were drawing “the last ounces of blood out of
this near corpse” by continuing to tax the New Haven. 38 In light of the intense competition for
traffic from air, water, and road transportation and the lackadaisical response of the relevant
states, Judge Anderson saw no choice but to allow the railroad to move ahead with its request to
eliminate passenger service. Congressional representatives, who neither wished to see the
crippling congestion and associated economic consequences forecasted in the event of
discontinuance, nor face angry constituents, found themselves in a bind.
The New Haven’s plan to discontinue passenger service prompted studies of the potential
consequences by urban planners in the region it served. These studies built on general regional
planning literature such as that of the RPA and galvanized the federal and state interventions to
preserve the New Haven’s commuter services. The Southwestern Regional Planning Agency,
based in Norwalk, CT, produced a study in 1965 surveying the plans made by Fairfield County
residents for alternatives to commuting by rail. Thirty-five percent of respondents indicated that
they would move out of the region entirely rather than endure highway traffic, indicating that the
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death of the commuter line would be a serious economic and social blow for Fairfield County. 39
Such commuter agitation was instrumental in motivating political activism against the New
Haven’s plan. The ICC would cite both sources of opposition when it denied the New Haven’s
discontinuance petition the next year.
M-Day: The ICC Mandates Commuter Service
The ICC decided the New Haven’s passenger discontinuance case on April 5,1966,
preventing an all-out abandonment of service and fully preserving commuter runs.40 The
decision was issued jointly with the commission’s approval of the proposed Pennsylvania–New
York Central merger, which was conditioned on the inclusion of the New Haven. Despite the
protests of the two large railroads, the newly formed Penn Central would not be allowed to
abandon the New Haven’s passenger services. The implications of the April 27 announcement of
this joint decision earned it the nickname “M-Day” (merger day) and set the stage for the biggest
merger in the history of American railroading. 41
In the decision, Vice Chairman William Tucker pointed out the railroads’ concerted
efforts to modernize freight service to keep up with competition from other modes, which he
contrasted with their reaction to competition for passengers:
Railroads in general seem at times to have aided and abetted in the decline of their
effectiveness as passenger carriers by permitting discomfort, delay,
undependability, poor scheduling, discourtesy, obsolete equipment, inadequate
space, insufficient facilities, and other disabilities for which railroad passenger
service has become increasingly notorious. 42
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This damning critique of the railroads’ neglect of passenger service, exhibited one of the core
sources of contempt among officials for the railroads’ incessant complaints about providing
public transportation. While railroads could have doubled down on passenger service in the
1940s and fifties by expanding marketing, investing in equipment maintenance, or exploring new
fare systems, they instead allowed it to atrophy with the hope of reducing demand to the point of
its eventual self-determining elimination.43
The ICC’s decision flatly rejected the argument, raised by Hilton and partially by the
railroads, that car, bus, and air transportation could completely replace passenger trains.
Importantly, the ICC affirmed the essential distinction between intercity service—which could
be supplanted to some extent by motor vehicles and airplanes—and commuting, in which the
railroads played an indispensable role. The Commission acknowledged that peak-period
commutation in particular would greatly increase congestion, pollution, and traffic deaths, and
argued that “the answer to this nation’s existing and anticipated surface travel problems is not to
be found in a continued over-reliance on highways.”44 Tucker cited several sources for this
position, the first being a wealth of support from citizens and their representatives, and
demonstrated willingness by the states concerned to subsidize service.45 From a federal
perspective, the ICC pointed to recently passed legislation calling for the Secretary of Commerce
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to research the possibility of high-speed passenger rail as evidence for government support for
passenger rail service.46
The powerful voices of Westchester and Fairfield County commuters made an impression
on the ICC and lent a human touch to regulatory hearings that otherwise were often decided on
dry economic terms.47 Tucker wrote that car and bus substitution for rail traffic into New York
City would be “completely inadequate, entailing much personal inconvenience and travel over
circuitous routes for extended times and extra distances.” 48 He went on to emphasize the
economic impact that such a measure would take on the region and even the nation, citing the
high incomes of suburbanites along the line and their correspondingly expensive homes that they
might abandon in the case of discontinued rail service. Testimony from commuters helped
establish the immense public inconvenience that discontinuing service would cause. Thus,
despite the presumed ability of Westchester and Fairfield commuters to afford the switch to auto
commuting, the ICC drew on the immense public expense required to accommodate such an
influx of traffic and the deleterious effects on income levels and the real estate markets in these
counties to justify the necessity of continued commuter service on the New Haven Line.
In effect, the ICC’s decision put the ball back in the states’ court to find an effective and
efficient plan to permanently subsidize commuter services. It validated many of the arguments
for commuter rail, which at this point had been hashed out endlessly, while also making clear
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that its decision to force the New Haven to continue its service (under the coming banner of Penn
Central) was predicated on the absorption of commuter deficits by the states involved. The ICC
decision would inspire New York and Connecticut to create the appropriate agencies to
administer (and eventually take over) commuter service, so that the states could seek any
available federal funds for shoring up the line and to provide oversight to ensure quality of
service and efficiency of operation. Unlike in later years, commuters and policymakers barely
raised energy use and pollution reduction justifications for commuter rail in the discussions
surrounding the New Haven’s bankruptcy; instead, rail advocates focused primarily on the
negative economic and spatial side effects of highway commutation. But how would New York
and Connecticut go about preserving commuter rail? The states faced a decision over whether to
subsidize private operation or create a new agency to operate the New Haven’s commuter
services.
Governor Rockefeller and the Formation of the MTA
The states responded to the dire situation of the New Haven with a subsidy established
under the aegis of the newly-formed Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA).
The MCTA had been created by the New York legislature in 1965 as part of its plan to buy the
Long Island Railroad (LIRR) from the Pennsylvania Railroad, which had been operating under
bankruptcy protection since 1949. A nearly exclusively passenger railroad that at the time was
the most heavily-used commuter carrier in the nation, the Long Island was in severe condition.49
The MCTA, the brainchild of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s transportation advisor,
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William Ronan, was intended to rejuvenate the LIRR by harnessing federal as well as state and
local funding sources. 50
The MCTA was created with New York’s other commuter railroads in mind as well, and
the Rockefeller administration took steps to expand its purview. In 1965, after the New Haven’s
clash with the ICC, the governors of New York and Connecticut—Rockefeller and his
counterpart, John Dempsey—agreed to subsidize service on the New Haven Line under an even
50–50 split.51 The subsidy would be paid to the New Haven and its successors to cover the costs
of providing service. Without this agreement, the New Haven would have discontinued its
commuter services; this was the point in the New Haven Line’s history where the threat of
liquidation was most real and imminent. 52
In an effort to seek a longer-term solution to the New Haven’s passenger woes, the
subsidy program hinged on a “federal mass transportation demonstration project” managed by
the Tri-State Transportation Committee (TSTC), chaired by William Ronan, and funded by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development under the recent Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964.53 The project provided a two-thirds federal subsidy for the line’s deficits (with the
states covering the remaining third) and called for a range of studies on improving various
aspects of commuter service. In its initial report, the TSTC raised the possibility of following the
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example of the LIRR and purchasing the line outright, although it posited this approach as
“complicated” due to the New Haven’s status “as an interstate, long-distance carrier as well as a
commuter line.”54 Nearly twenty years before the founding of Metro-North, William Ronan’s
TSTC identified what would become the New Haven Line’s greatest challenge: coordinating the
interests of and funding from two state governments.
Heeding the advice of the TSTC, the New York legislature stopped short of including a
takeover of the New Haven Line in its massive 1968 expansion of the MCTA to form the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA).55 Under the chairmanship of William Ronan, the
MTA gained responsibility for overseeing operations on New York City’s northern commuter
lines (including the newly-subsidized New Haven Line), which would shortly be included in the
Penn Central merger. The formation of the MTA represented the second step in the progression
towards public ownership that began with the establishment of a subsidy in 1965.
In its final act, the MCTA prepared a “Program for Action,” delivered to Rockefeller, that
laid out a plan for the new MTA and called for extensive capital investment in all areas of New
York City’s rail services. This document was a seminal work of regional transportation planning
for the New York metropolitan area, and it marked the beginning of a slow process of tangible
modernization on the New Haven Line. Now that the New Haven Line was under state
supervision, the MTA could make an effort to amass city, state, and federal funds—and initiate
cooperation with the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CDOT)—to implement such
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improvements as buying new, air-conditioned cars, installing high-level platforms at stations,
rehabilitating tracks, and maintaining the electric power delivery system. 56
Despite the glimmer of hope offered by the quickly-moving consolidation of New York’s
transportation infrastructure in the MTA under Governor Rockefeller, the states’ unwillingness
to purchase the entire New Haven commuter railroad outright ensured that progress would
remain limited for the next decade. While the MTA, with cooperation from Connecticut,
succeeded in advancing state funds and applying for federal grants for some capital
improvements, the freight railroads (first Penn Central, then Conrail) that provided day-to-day
operations continued to de-prioritize commuters at every opportunity. As a result, the rider
experience continued to suffer, which helped provide the impetus for the creation of Metro-North
nearly two decades later.
Though the gloom of the New Haven Line continued into the 1970s, the significance of
Governor Rockefeller’s leadership on creating the MTA with commuter railroads in mind as part
of a larger regional mass transportation network cannot be overstated. When the time came at
last in 1983 to hand control over to the MTA, the transition was simple thanks to the MTA’s
ample experience managing commuter rail by that point.57 By formally aligning commuter rail
with more conventional forms of public transit that were already well-understood as needing
subsidies, Rockefeller’s creation of the MTA helped save the New Haven Line from oblivion.
Moreover, it laid the groundwork for an eventual transition of the line to full public ownership
and operation.
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No Rest for the Weary: The Stagnant ’70s under Penn Central and
Conrail
With the ICC-mandated inclusion of the New Haven’s commuter lines in the newlymerged Penn Central, talk of discontinuance temporarily abated. The Penn Central experiment
was a colossal failure, and upon its bankruptcy in 1970 the federal government faced an even
larger reorganization proceeding. From the ashes of Penn Central, Congress created the
government-owned railroad Conrail in 1973 to continue freight and commuter service in the
Northeast. The death of Penn Central also spurred Congress to create the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) in 1971 to operate intercity passenger services, at last freeing
the freight railroads of the burden they had complained of endlessly for the past half-century.
The inclusion of Penn Central’s commuter lines in Conrail meant that little changed for New
Haven Line commuters in the 1970s, except that the ever-greater drive to turn a profit meant that
the capital investments needed to reverse the years of deferred maintenance on the New Haven
Line were never prioritized as freight considerations continued to rule investment decisions. As a
result, commuter service maintained its downward trajectory despite new ownership and the
MTA subsidy arrangement.
Penn Central Does Not Live up to Expectations (to Put It Lightly)
On February 1, 1968, Penn Central formally began operating the trains of the former New
Haven, New York Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads, and the railroad industry and regulators
alike cautiously watched the new super-railroad for its anticipated $100 million in expected
annual savings.58 The executive director of the Connecticut Transportation Authority, Samuel
Kanell, prophetically told the New York Times that the New Haven section of the system might
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never be profitable, but the railroad as a whole must succeed financially or else “transportation in
this country” would not “go on as a free enterprise.” 59 Instead, they witnessed the complete
collapse of two of the nation’s most storied railroads in just over two short years. Instead of
saving $100 million a year, Penn Central lost one million dollars a day.60
Penn Central failed for a multitude of reasons, most of which did not have to do with its
passenger services. Many books have been written on this subject; the failure was covered
contemporaneously by journalists Joseph Daughen and Peter Binzen in Wreck of the Penn
Central (1971) and revisited in impressive detail by railroad veteran-cum-history professor
Richard Saunders, Jr. in Merging Lines (2001). Historians Robert Gallamore and John Meyer
pointed to a litany of factors behind the failure: high labor costs, state and local taxation,
highway competition, ICC regulation, continued mandatory absorption of passenger service
losses, and managerial greed and “diseconomies of scale.”61 Even though planning for the
merger stretched back to 1957, the three merged railroads did a poor job coordinating operations.
Shippers would send loaded cars from their plants only to have them return full of the same
goods several weeks later. 62 The NYC and PRR computer systems, which the railroads bought
after they had decided to merge, were incompatible, and auditors noted that patrons of the
railroad were frequently not billed for service as a result. 63
Despite the numerous failures of Penn Central, the most public criticism was reserved for
its passenger service, as a quarter-million daily commuters to Philadelphia, New York, and

Associated Press, “Profit Envisioned for Penn Central,” New York Times, February 12, 1968, 60, quoted in Robert
Holzweiss, “Penn Central Reconsidered,” Railroad History, Fall-Winter 2017, 24.
60
Saunders, Merging Lines, xvii.
61
Gallamore and Meyer, American Railroads, 149–54, pointed to the Senate’s 1972 “Barber Report” on the disaster
as confirmation that the collapse could not be blamed on a single factor but rather a deadly confluence of
mismanagement and negative external conditions.
62
Michael Gartner, Riding the Pennsy to Ruin: A Wall Street Journal Chronicle of the Penn Central Debacle
(Princeton, N.J: Dow Jones Books, 1971), 4.
63
Saunders, Merging Lines, 389.
59

28

Boston suffered rides on often-filthy cars up to 60 years old. Penn Central acknowledged the
further decline of passenger service but argued that its heavy deficits made adequate
maintenance impossible. 64 The states made some highly-publicized improvement efforts through
their capital programs for the line, such as the highly-publicized delivery of 144 new M2 railcars
in 1973 to replace the pre-World War II cars that made up two-thirds of the New Haven Line
fleet as late as 1968.65 Yet these efforts did little to address chronic delays and overall poor
service by Penn Central; in a cruel twist, commuters trapped in a tunnel under Park Avenue due
to a third-rail malfunction watched the first of the new M2 cars, carrying Governor Rockefeller
and other officials, roll by on its way to Grand Central Terminal on April 17, 1973. Even the new
train, with its VIP cargo, was twelve minutes late. 66
Amtrak: Passenger Panacea?
The Penn Central debacle brought about the creation of Amtrak to relieve the freight
railroads of the burden of operating intercity passenger rail service. President Nixon’s Secretary
of Transportation, John Volpe, prepared a plan for rail passenger service that Congress
enthusiastically adopted in 1970. Despite the national decline of intercity train travel, many
members of Congress believed in the necessity of government preservation of a basic national
passenger railroad network. 67 Amtrak garnered bipartisan support for its market-based provisions
which avoided direct subsidy while preventing the complete abandonment of a well-liked
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alternative to intercity air, bus, and car travel.68 The profit-minded idealism of the Amtrak
legislation belied a fundamental problem with the system that has persisted to this day:
Congressional representatives, beholden to their constituents, have consistently required Amtrak
to maintain its loss-inducing long-distance trains while attempting to turn a profit. 69
Nevertheless, the basic premise of Amtrak was that it could reverse decades of declining
passenger service through a focus on providing for passengers as its primary customers.70 The
establishment of Amtrak set a precedent for public sector management as a path to an improved
rider experience that would resurface in the promises of Metro-North’s management a decade
later.
The creation of Amtrak brought to light the awkward position of commuter rail in a
neglected middle ground between urban mass transit and interstate, national transportation
services. Amtrak did not take on the commuter services operated by Penn Central in cities along
the Northeast Corridor. Commuter rail service was instead left with Penn Central as it waded
through bankruptcy proceedings and the federal government pondered how to handle the
Northeast railroad fiasco in a lasting manner. Amtrak was available to operate commuter services
under contract with local commuter authorities like the MTA, but its intended focus was
national, interstate service rather than all-encompassing management of all domestic train routes.
Even though commuter trains often served multiple states (as in the case of the New Haven Line)
and were of clear import for the functioning economies of the nation’s largest cities, the federal
government had no interest in managing them. The cities these trains served were left out of the
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picture for the same reason, and instead states were forced to subsidize service and enter into
compacts when necessary to coordinate multi-state funding.
Although the railroad’s bankruptcy prompted the states served by Penn Central’s
commuter services to take further steps toward full ownership, the states remained content to
continue to contract out operations due to the additional budgetary and bureaucratic burden of
ownership and the difficulty of coordinating interstate funding and management. The federal
demonstration grant had expired in 1968, so in 1969 the two states enacted the Connecticut–New
York Passenger Compact that formalized a continuing program of subsidy and provided for the
states to acquire related assets from the railroad. 71 The Penn Central bankruptcy provided an
opportunity for the states to take a major step toward public ownership: in 1970, they concluded
a Service Agreement with the railroad wherein the MTA bought and the CDOT leased trackage
and associated properties along the New Haven Line. 72 The MTA heralded this achievement as
the end to “years of intensive efforts by both states to develop the means to improve the ailing
line” and specifically celebrated a special note it had put out to riders in collaboration with the
CDOT on the day of the takeover that signaled, “We know what you've been going through.
Help is on the way.”73
Despite this optimistic language, the states did not elect to assume full control of the line
from Penn Central, likely due in part to the difficulties of coordinating continued Penn Central
freight service and Amtrak intercity service. 74 Even so, the two states had achieved the third
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major step in the two-decade progression towards public ownership on the New Haven Line: in
addition to contractual control over standards of service through the MTA, the states now held
physical title to the infrastructure that had been allowed to deteriorate badly up to that point.
State ownership of the New Haven Line laid the groundwork for publicly-funded upgrades to the
railroad’s physical plant in the name of commuter passenger service. 75 Though ownership of the
infrastructure undoubtedly represented progress, New York and Connecticut’s continuing
unwillingness to fully take over commuter operations spelled out further woes for daily
commuters as they were handed off from one unforgiving freight railroad to another in the
replacement of Penn Central with Conrail in 1976.
Uncle Sam Steps In: The Coming of Conrail
The failure of Penn Central made clear that more drastic steps were needed to address the
Northeast rail service problem. The creation of Amtrak had done little to reverse the fortunes of
the now-bankrupt Penn Central, despite years of protestations from the railroads that passenger
services constituted the source of all their losses. A one-day strike by Penn Central employees in
February 1973 spurred Congress into action to come up with a new approach for railroad service
in the region.76 Yet the Nixon administration had no interest in pursuing a full European-style
nationalization, which would symbolically mark a defeat for capitalism. 77 The other option,
liquidation, was rejected out-of-hand; shutting down Penn Central would affect nearly half the
United States’ factories and cause an estimated 2.7% decline in the gross national product. 78
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Defense concerns also played a role in the government’s unwillingness to consign Penn Central
to death by market forces. 79 Truck transportation was inherently less fuel efficient, and
America’s petroleum was supplied in large part by unpredictable foreign nations. 80 Congress
sought to find a middle ground between the extremes of nationalization and liquidation, much as
it had for Amtrak.
The result was the Regional Rail Reorganization (3R) Act, passed in December 1973,
which called for the creation of a private corporation owned by the United States, like Amtrak.
Conrail would receive funds from the federal government to build a pared-down, core freight
network for the Northeast that would eventually become financially self-sustaining. It was an
ambitious goal, and the 3R Act provided for the creation of the United States Railway
Association (USRA) to study several options and from these prepare a plan for such a network.81
Notably, the 3R Act included in its findings an explicit articulation by the legislature of the
advantages of rail transportation, with particular attention to environmental considerations,
which were and are still relevant to both passenger and freight service:
Rail service and rail transportation offer economic and environmental advantages
with respect to land use, air pollution, noise levels, energy efficiency and
conservation, resource allocation, safety, and cost per ton-mile of movement to
such extent that the preservation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail
service is in the national interest. 82
This finding expanded the government’s interest in continued rail service beyond the prevailing
economic considerations to include environmentalist concerns such as pollution and land use.
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The mention of land use especially affirmed the motivations of the state and local governments
(such as New York and Connecticut) that had begun to reject highways in favor of railroads for
the management of urban commuting.
In a House of Representatives hearing on the USRA’s Final System Plan for Conrail in
1975, the new railroad’s commuter service obligation was one of the primary topics the
committee members discussed. Arthur Lewis, Chairman of the USRA, expressed his belief that
Amtrak and commuter service authorities were inadequately compensating Conrail’s predecessor
railroads for their passenger operations, and feared that this deficit would cause Conrail losses in
excess of $1.65 billion in the next decade and prevent its freight services from achieving
profitability for the railroad if not addressed.83 The USRA noted that the state legislatures
responsible for appropriating funds to cover commuter service costs frequently underspent in this
area, forcing Conrail’s predecessors to pick up the difference as losses; however, it singled out
Penn Central’s contracts with the MTA and CDOT as examples of adequately compensatory
arrangements.84
Conrail’s Chairman and CEO, Edward Jordan, highlighted the Final System Plan’s
recommendation that Amtrak and the commuter agencies take over routes primarily dedicated to
passenger service, implying that the Northeast Corridor route (including the New Haven Line)
was increasingly irrelevant for freight movements and could soon sustain direct operation by
Amtrak and local authorities..85 The Preliminary System Plan had further advocated that “to
minimize freight–passenger conflict, Conrail through-freight service should be moved, insofar as
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possible, to a separate right-of-way.”86 New York and Connecticut had stopped short of fully
acquiring the New Haven Line’s commuter operations in 1971 due to the ease of contracting
with Penn Central, but now Conrail formally requested that the states completely relieve it of this
obligation.
The hearing reveals that even before it entered revenue service, Conrail’s top leadership
expressed concerns that including commuter operations would hinder the freight railroad from
achieving its profitability objective and encouraged their takeover by local authorities. At the
same time, they acknowledged that the subsidies paid for the New Haven Line were sufficient.
Lewis and Jordan’s comments foreshadowed the continued neglect of commuter service under
Conrail as it strove, under Congressional mandate, to improve freight operations to the point of
turning a profit. Their comments also outlined many of the arguments Conrail would make to a
more sympathetic Reagan administration in the early 1980s.
Conrail was formally inaugurated on April 1, 1976 to take over from Penn Central and a
number of other regional railroads after Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform (4R) Act to implement the USRA’s Final System Plan. Signing the 4R Act
into law, President Ford optimistically commented that “we expect that within five years Conrail
will overcome the unprofitable legacy of the bankrupt lines,” in an eerie echo of the false
optimism that surrounded the Penn–Central merger eight years before. 87 Commuter service was
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little mentioned in both the 3R and 4R acts, indicating federal unwillingness to address the
thorny problems it posed.
As commuters would soon find out, their practical omission from the legislation was
reflected in their experience on the railroad. After seven years of deteriorating service from Penn
Central and decades of neglect from the New Haven, the transition to Conrail on April Fool’s
Day, 1976, “changed little except train crew hat badges;” they would now be subject to the
vicissitudes of yet another freight carrier actively trying to rid itself of the very passenger trains
they relied on to get to and from work every day.88
Conrail Quality: Last Straws for the MTA
Under Conrail, commuter service on the New Haven Line continued to deteriorate. Yet it
would be the action of Conrail executives coupled with the permission of the federal government
alongside agitation from disgruntled commuters, rather than initiative on the part of the MTA or
CDOT, that would finally spark the last steps toward public ownership that resulted in the
creation of Metro-North in 1983.
Conrail’s “Metropolitan Region” service—a continuation of Penn Central’s commuter
operations on the New Haven Line as well as the former New York Central Harlem and Hudson
Lines to the west—quickly garnered the same unfavorable press from its riders as its
predecessors had. A New York Times article from 1979 characterized on-time performance as
“erratic,” with “frequent breakdowns in air conditioning, improper lighting, and shortened
trains.”89 Commuter action groups like the Permanent Citizens’ Advisory Committee (PCAC) to

Middleton, “How Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First Rate in a Decade,” 10.
Edward Hudson, “Conrail Commuter Lines Found Declining With Bad Equipment,” New York Times, September
17, 1979. The general collapse of good service progressed to the point where the New York Department of
Transportation (NYDOT) commissioned a study of the problem. NYDOT found that most delays were caused by
equipment failures and inadequate maintenance. This implied that the money the states had invested in buying new
cars for the lines was going to waste as Conrail did not bother to provide them adequate maintenance.
88
89

36

the MTA noted that despite its service contract with Conrail, the MTA did not assess penalties
for poor service. The problems with Penn Central had carried over to Conrail, as the states
blamed the railroad for poor service while the railroad washed its hands of responsibility by
pleading a lack of funding. The Times article also mentions a suggestion from “some
commuters” that the MTA take over the railroad, to which the MTA Executive Director, John
Simpson, responded only softly, suggesting that the idea be “explored” but distancing himself
from a direct endorsement.90
The persistence of Conrail’s problems despite the MTA’s various stopgap measures
revealed the fundamental ineffectiveness of the subsidy scheme and laid out the case for the
MTA to take over the line. In 1980, it came time to renew the service contract with Conrail.
Commuters’ suggestion of an MTA takeover was once again considered as the contract
renegotiations neared, but it was again jettisoned in favor of the status quo. The PCAC continued
to sound warnings about the dire state of Conrail service, with its chairman emphasizing that
“every single performance indicator dropped significantly over the past year.” 91
Conrail’s good-faith effort to improve service with new management proved fruitless and
further affirmed the need for new ownership. In August 1980, after a summer of broken air
conditioning and delayed trains, Conrail named a new general manager for its Metropolitan
Region: Joseph Spreng was a Penn Central veteran who claimed to grasp that commuter
railroading was “50 percent public relations.” Accordingly, he ordered all Conrail supervisors to
ride two Conrail trains a day for his first month on the job. 92 Despite Spreng’s strong credentials,
he too betrayed the all-too-familiar disdain for commuters, whom he called “gutter urchins when
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they get upset.”93 That the MTA, under the new leadership of Richard Ravitch, had not been
informed beforehand of Spreng’s appointment indicated the degree of disconnect it held with
Conrail despite their professed shared goal of improved service. 94
By the end of 1980, Conrail had neither made the profits wished for by optimistic
members of Congress, nor had it reversed the fortunes of New York’s commuter rail lines. As
such, change was afoot as both the federal government and New York and Connecticut sought
alternatives to the status quo. The historic Staggers Rail Act, passed in October 1980, opened the
door for the substantial deregulation of the railroads and the end of the iron grip of the ICC;
Conrail’s inability to turn a profit had at last helped members of Congress see the burdens of ICC
rate controls on railroads as they struggled to compete with other transportation modes despite
their natural advantages for freight service.95
Meanwhile Spreng, despite his early optimism, had declared the New Haven Line in
“crisis” by December and called (like countless others before and after) for additional state funds
toward modernization.96 New York State began the motions of seeking alternative options to
Conrail service, including the possibility of spinning off the LIRR and the Conrail commuter
lines into a unified commuter agency separate from the MTA (which was viewed as bloated).97
These actions were long overdue; the poor state of service had been well-known since the 1960s
and New York had experienced success operating the LIRR directly. I attribute New York and
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Connecticut’s failure to take the New Haven Line over earlier to the difficulties of coordinating
interstate service and subsidy, bureaucratic predisposition towards the status quo, and
unwillingness to spend additional funds to properly operate and rehabilitate the line. Fortunately,
the MTA’s hand would shortly be forced by the new presidential administration: Ronald Reagan,
elected in November 1980, took aim at large government programs. Conrail was a soft target,
and the period from 1981 to 1983 would result in the creation of Metro-North as American
freight and passenger rail service at long last became completely separated.
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New Beginnings: Metro-North Takes the Reins
The creation of Metro-North was federally initiated. The Reagan administration forced
Conrail to accelerate its return to the private sector or face liquidation, and Conrail turned to
Congress to request that it at last be relieved of the burden of providing commuter services.
Despite decades of rider complaints, New York and Connecticut had never initiated a plan to
fully take over the New Haven Line. There is no particular reason that this step could not have
been taken years earlier than 1983. Metro-North did not receive increased subsidies upon its
creation nor did the transition require some exceedingly large capital outlay. 98 In fact, the
transition to Metro-North operation was almost exclusively a management shift, and yet it
produced a profound turnaround in the next ten years for commuters, who had not received good
service since the Second World War. That remarkable improvement, then, is attributable to the
hard work of Metro-North’s new officers to strike a better deal with labor, change the culture of
the organization, and renegotiate subsidies with New York and Connecticut. By the mid-1990s,
Metro-North was a poster child for the accomplishments that a public agency could make in
improving service where the private sector, even with copious subsidy, had failed.
Conrail Refresh in 1981 Jettisons Commuter Services
The original intention of Conrail was to pour government dollars into a rehabilitation of a
pared-down version of the Northeast freight rail system so that it could return to profitability and
become private again. As the Reagan administration took power in 1981, Conrail had spent $3
billion in federal aid without profits to show for it, and fears swirled again over the fate of the
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railroad industry as a whole.99 Despite impressive improvements in the state of its fixed plant,
ICC regulations had still limited the railroad in its ability to compete, and its unions continued to
enforce inefficient work rules that resulted in the railroad spending a far higher portion of its
operating budget on labor than its industry peers.100
Conrail’s first president, Edward Jordan, who retired at the end of 1980, was replaced
with L. Stanley Crane, who was instrumental in bringing Conrail to profitability.101 Crane
believed that the deregulation of the Staggers Act, allowing further honing of the railroad’s
sprawling network, along with further negotiation with labor, could allow the railroad to achieve
its original goal in a few more years. Reagan administrators, particularly Secretary of
Transportation Drew Lewis and Federal Railroad Administrator Robert Blanchette, were
skeptical of this argument and sought to dismantle Conrail over Crane’s protestations, selling its
lines off piecemeal. 102
Congress was more optimistic, and in a compromise with the administration passed the
Northeast Rail Service Act (NERSA) of 1981. This key piece of legislation set up a profitability
test as advocated by Crane. The bill allowed Crane to keep the railroad intact for an eventual
return to the private sector if he could realize the return to the black as he promised by 1983. 103
To facilitate the turnaround, NERSA included a provision relieving Conrail of its commuter
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service obligations, effective January 1, 1983. 104 Crane reflected in retrospect that “Conrail's
responsibility for commuter service, on which we'd lost upwards of $250 million in five years,
was one thing that clearly had to go,” and Lewis and Blanchette were more than happy to
devolve government services to the states where possible. 105 Conrail’s story would quickly
become one of success: Crane managed to post the company’s first-ever profit in 1981, and the
railroad returned to the private sector as promised in 1987, with a huge initial public offering that
netted $1.65 billion. Could the shakeup of NERSA have a similar effect on the New Haven Line?
Ravitch Sets the Stage, 1981–1983
On the MTA side of things, chairman Richard Ravitch negotiated the Congressionallymandated handover by demanding additional funds and appointing experienced commuter rail
leadership to manage the transition away from Conrail. Ravitch described the MTA’s assumption
of the Conrail commuter lines as an “unsought opportunity” presented to him over lunch by
Drew Lewis; in other words, the MTA (or Ravitch, at least) had not seriously considered the
prospect of taking over the lines, despite agitation from commuter groups tired of being subject
to the whims of larger railroads.106 Lewis’s “opportunity” was of course less a suggestion and
more a warning. Regardless, it set the wheels in motion for the MTA to take over the lines.
Ravitch’s first step was to assemble a team to manage the transition. To this end, he
brought in Peter Stangl, who was Assistant Commissioner of Public Transportation for New
Jersey, to lead the group, along with Howard Permut, a transit executive from Chicago, and
Donald Nelson, an experienced northeast railroader, among a few others.107 Stangl had
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recommended the creation of New Jersey Transit to take over from the bankrupt railroads and
bus companies that served commuters in that state. One of his first recommendations to Ravitch
was that the MTA operate the Conrail lines directly, as opposed to contracting out operation to
Amtrak or another private entity. 108 Stangl figured that the MTA would be held accountable for
the railroad’s performance regardless, and, given the precedent set by its longstanding operation
of the LIRR, it would make sense to bring the northern lines in-house as well.109 Stangl was also
keenly aware of Amtrak’s shortcomings: in his view Amtrak was inadequately funded by the
federal government, which prevented it from attracting the best management, and it also had an
interest in providing high-speed intercity service along the Northeast Corridor that could run
counter to prioritizing commuter operations. 110
Fearful of the additional costs of a transition to MTA ownership, Ravitch pressed
Congress to provide funding to ensure that the MTA would not incur additional debt in taking
over the railroad. He testified that the MTA and CDOT would need an additional $70 million to
prevent fare increases attached to the takeover, and firmly stated that “It would be irresponsible
for us to undertake operation of these lines in the absence of appropriate funding and we do not
intend to do so.”111 Ravitch also requested unsuccessfully that Congress allow the MTA to place
its future railroad employees under state labor protections rather than federal protections, which
had cost Conrail large sums. Like Stangl, Ravitch shot down the argument that the MTA could
avoid the costs of transition by opting for Amtrak, since Amtrak’s burdensome labor agreements
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and low prospects for attracting top-shelf management made it highly unlikely to provide good
service.112
The new Metro-North Commuter Railroad was inaugurated on New Year’s Day, 1983,
with Peter Stangl as its first president. Ravitch’s activism before Congress had won the MTA
funding from the federal government to defray the costs of transition. 113 Stangl emphasized the
commuter-as-customer focus of the new railroad. In a flyer distributed to riders, he
acknowledged that “Metro-North has no magic wand to undo the years of financial neglect that
have left their mark on the quality of service you experience daily,” but promised that it was a
“challenge that those of us at Metro-North welcome and to which we are committed.”114 Despite
the lack of ceremony—other than a visit by Stangl and his wife to Grand Central Terminal at
midnight to quietly mark the switch—the change was momentous: in the coming decades,
Metro-North would double its ridership with remarkable service improvements.115 The creation
of the new railroad provided an opportunity for Metro-North’s management to renegotiate labor
rules and subsidies, gaining it a stable financial footing as the railroad undertook the project of
reversing decades of neglect.
Labor Rules Clash Halts the “Subway North”
On March 7, 1983, just two months after Metro-North came into being, its workforce
went on strike, forcing 90,000 daily riders on the Harlem, Hudson, and New Haven Lines to
struggle to find alternate ways to work. New Jersey Transit (NJT) had just experienced the start
of a similar strike; NJT had attempted to cut pay for mid-day idle time while Metro-North sought
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unilateral control over train crew sizes in an effort to cut jobs (union work rules required as many
as three trainmen—not counting the conductor—on commuter trains, even though only one was
needed to operate the train).116 Commuters interviewed were generally sympathetic to the
MTA’s demands, and the New York Times editorial page endorsed Ravitch’s attempt at
“shedding expensive customs and inexpensive habits.”117
The strike illustrated just what life might have been like had the New Haven succeeded in
dissolving commuter operations. Even with a large number of commuters taking buses provided
by the MTA and CDOT and some opting to stay home, New York’s northern highways were
immediately “clogged” with “bumper-to-bumper traffic,” and trip times doubled in length. 118
Five weeks into the strike, the New York Times doubled down on its position, asking, “Does
anyone believe that a few hundred conductors have the right to damage the city’s economy,
inconvenience 90,000 commuters and put thousands of fellow rail employees out of work for no
good reason?”119
The Metro-North strike ended on April 16, when the union agreed to enter binding
arbitration with the railroad. In August, the arbitrators gave Metro-North additional power to
determine train crew sizes while reserving consultation rights to the union; the settlement was
mutually agreeable to both parties. 120 Stangl noted that while Metro-North did not get all the
work rule changes it wanted, its management felt it had received enough concessions to justify
the strike.121 In retrospect, the degree to which the MTA resolved the strike to its advantage is
much less clear. As the trains began rolling again, Ravitch revealed that he hoped to replace train
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conductors with a futuristic, magnetic stripe-based automatic fare collection system (a union
negotiator pejoratively declared Ravitch’s plan the “subway north”). 122 Yet to this day, MetroNorth continues to employ conductors to collect fares despite multiple attempts at implementing
such a system (and widespread phasing-out of commuter rail conductors across the globe in
favor of automatic payment). Though Metro-North may not have achieved the full victory over
labor it had sought, its hardline approach demonstrated to the public a strong desire among the
new leadership to streamline inefficiencies in the name of improving service.
Renegotiating Subsidies: Arbitrators Demand Connecticut Pay More
Metro-North achieved further financial stability when a new manager initiated
renegotiation of its subsidy arrangement. It is almost impossible to imagine Conrail or Penn
Central taking the same step in the name of its customers; they were more apt simply complain
about their obligation to provide service to begin with. The MTA entered into voluntary
arbitration with Connecticut in 1983 to renegotiate the subsidy split. New York and Connecticut
had split costs for the New Haven Line evenly ever since Governors Rockefeller and Dempsey’s
agreement in 1965. Howard Permut, a member of the original Metro-North team, had argued
during planning for the new railroad that the 50–50 split did not reflect the fact that Connecticut
had more passengers riding the railroad than New York and that they were generally traveling
farther.123 The arbitration was not resolved until June 1985, when Connecticut was ordered to
assume 56.29% of the total operating deficit under the so-called Amended and Restated Service
Agreement (ARSA).124
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The question of equitable subsidy would continue to nag Metro-North. In 1995, the states
entered arbitration again, which this time further increased Connecticut’s share of the deficit to
65%.125 A Connecticut Department of Transportation report analyzing the ARSA characterized
the MTA’s leadership role in operating Metro-North service as the origins of the inequality
between the two states, noting that before 1983 CDOT and MTA, “on more or less equal footing,
dealt with an independent third party that ostensibly favored neither subsidizer.” 126 Connecticut’s
gloss on this issue served to explain the increasingly inadequate funding the state had been
giving Metro-North; from the late 1990s through the 2000s, Connecticut seriously “disinvested”
in the New Haven Line. 127
Metro-North at Ten: Reflecting on a Remarkable Turnaround
In 1993, Metro-North was almost unrecognizable from its condition ten years earlier. Its
management boasted extraordinarily high performance metrics on a railroad formerly known for
such stories as “the time the 4:08 arrived at 8:04.”128 The darling subject of such articles as “How
Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First-Rate in a Decade,” Metro-North had improved its
on-time performance from 80.5% to 96%, reduced costs (as measured by the percentage of the
budget made up by fare revenues) from 63.2% to 47.3%, and lifted ridership by 17%.129 By most
accounts, Peter Stangl’s businesslike approach to treat commuters as “customers” had worked.
The states’ capital programs had at last allowed the railroad to reach a level footing after years of
deferred maintenance, labor had backed off its most arcane work rules, and the inclusion of the
railroad in the MTA gave citizens and legislatures alike a greater sense of ownership in and
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responsibility for the line. Undoubtedly, public ownership of the railroad contributed
significantly to this success, even if the push that led to the MTA’s takeover came not from
Albany or Hartford but from Capitol Hill and the White House. Subsidies and serious capital
programs had failed to turn around deteriorating service on the New Haven Line for the two
decades prior to 1983 as it was shuffled between three freight railroads equally uninterested in its
success; it was not until the MTA assumed control of the line that its commuters’ fortunes
changed—rapidly—for the better.
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Conclusion: Metro-North in the 21st Century and Beyond
Up until the 2010s, Metro-North’s upward trajectory continued, albeit on a gradual slope.
By its thirtieth anniversary, the railroad had fully doubled its ridership since inception, and in
2011 Metro-North became the first American railroad to win the Brunel Award for Overall
Excellence in Railroad Design. 130
Age has revealed some of the cracks in the railroad’s formula. Connecticut and New
York remain antagonistic about relative subsidy levels. The railroad has yet to implement basic
upgrades like an automated fare collection system. 131 Despite extensive capital investments, the
fastest ride times over the length of the New Haven Line are two minutes slower today than they
were on the eve of the First World War. 132 A 2013 crash in Fairfield injured 65 and exposed
inadequacies in Metro-North’s track inspection procedures.133
One current Metro-North project merits mention in closing; it highlights some of the
agency’s strengths and pitfalls. Penn Station Access is a proposal dating as far back as 1999 for
Metro-North to build stations in the Bronx along the so-called Hell Gate Line, Amtrak’s route
between Penn Station and the New Haven Line, which it meets at New Rochelle. 134 Penn Station
Access would drastically improve transit service for this area of the East Bronx, halving the
Manhattan commute time for more than 100,000 residents. The expansion would also give
Metro-North more flexibility in routing trains and would dovetail with the MTA’s East Side

“N.Y. MTA Metro-North Railroad Turns 30,” 30.
The MTA announced on February 23, 2019, that it would implement a new contactless payment system, OMNY,
for its subways and buses that would be expanded to commuter rail “over several years.”
132
Frank Juliano, “Train Ride to NYC Was Faster 100 Years Ago,” Connecticut Post, September 16, 2014,
https://www.ctpost.com/news/article/Train-ride-to-NYC-was-faster-100-years-ago-5757193.php.
133
“Derailment and Subsequent Collision of Two Metro-North Passenger Trains,” Railroad Accident Brief (National
Transportation Safety Board, October 24, 2014), 1, 7,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1409.pdf.
134
“Watching as the Trains Pass, Then Having to Take the Bus,” New York Times, June 26, 2002,
https://nyti.ms/2ELUIUr; “Getting Back on Track: Unlocking the Full Potential of the New Haven Line” (New
York: Regional Plan Association, January 2014), 24, http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-Getting-Back-on-Track.pdf.
130
131

51

Access project to bring LIRR trains to Grand Central Terminal. Twenty years later, the $1 billion
Penn Station Access project has at last been approved, as Amtrak and Metro-North resolved a
months-long fight over access to the rail line, which Amtrak owns. 135
Penn Station Access illustrates the best and worst of Metro-North. As a public agency,
Metro-North is devoted to improving transportation access for all, including some lower- and
middle-income Bronx residents, rather than simply serving the wealthy suburban white-collar
workers living in Westchester and Fairfield counties. The Penn Station Access project is also
demonstrative of a desire on the part of Metro-North to improve the customer experience, by
expanding service on the New Haven Line to enable service to both Manhattan’s East and West
Sides. However, the delays on the project are indicative of the continued de-prioritization and
underfunding of transit in the United States, even in a city as transit-rich as New York. Amtrak’s
bickering with Metro-North evinces the curious place of commuter rail in many American
metropolises, particularly in the Northeast. While Metro-North is operated as part of a
metropolitan transit agency, it must battle with Amtrak for priority on shared lines, and the two
endlessly point to each other for under-investing in the infrastructure. The situation on the New
Haven Line is further complicated by its bi-state nature; even Metro-North itself is continually
underfunded due to perennial infighting.136
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The foresight of Governor Rockefeller saved the New Haven Line—and saved New York
City from further destruction for automobile facilities—in the 1960s, just in time for the nascent
environmental movement and the energy crises to give Americans another reason not to drive to
and from work each day. As a gradual process of public acquisition and increasing subsidy
culminated in the formation of Metro-North in 1983, commuting by rail became desirable again
for residents of New York and Connecticut living near the New Haven Line. Recognizing
commuter rail for the public transit that it is—a common good deserving of government subsidy
in exchange for wide-ranging economic and quality-of-life benefits—set the New Haven Line up
for success as Metro-North began to chart its own path in 1983.

(12,466 words)
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Timeline
1848

New York & New Haven railroad is completed.

1949

Long Island Railroad (LIRR) enters receivership (bankruptcy), operation is subsidized by
the State of New York.

1961

New Haven Railroad enters receivership; Interstate Commerce Commission mandates
that it continue operating passenger services.

1965

New York State buys out the LIRR from the Pennsylvania Railroad and establishes the
Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA) to operate it. New York and
Connecticut jointly subsidize the New Haven Line’s commuter operations in equal
shares.

1968

MCTA merges with the New York City Transit Authority, which operated buses and
subways, and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority to form the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA). The MTA also begins to oversee commuter rail
operation north of the city on the New Haven Line and the New York Central Railroad.

1968

The New Haven, New York Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads are merged into the new
Penn Central system, which takes over operating the New Haven’s passenger services the
next year.

1970

Penn Central declares bankruptcy; the federal government scrambles to deal with what
was then the largest bankruptcy in American history.

1971

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), formed by Congress the year
prior to relieve railroads of unprofitable passenger operations, takes over all U.S. intercity
passenger rail traffic. The MTA buys and the Connecticut Department of Transportation
leases their respective portions of the New Haven Line from Penn Central.

1973

Congress passes the Rail Reorganization (3R) Act, which creates the United States
Railway Association (USRA) to develop a plan to preserve rail service (which Congress
still viewed as vital to industry) in the Northeast.

1976

Congress passes the Rail Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act, which
implements the USRA’s plan for a new, government-owned Northeast rail carrier—the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail)—to take over the freight and commuter services
of the former Penn Central and achieve financial self-sufficiency. Commuter services
were to be fully subsidized by the relevant regional commuter transportation authorities.

1981

The Reagan Administration targets Conrail, which had yet to turn a profit, as an
unacceptably expensive government service and seeks its liquidation. Congress passes
the Northeast Rail Service Act, which creates a profitability test for Conrail and allows it
to transfer commuter operations (which were a clear money-loser) to local authorities.

1983

The newly-formed Metro-North Railroad, a division of the MTA, begins operating
commuter service on the New Haven and former New York Central lines. After a
crippling six-week strike, the railroad began continuous operation in April.
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1985

An arbitration panel increases Connecticut’s share of funding for the line from 50 to
60%. Connecticut buys its portion of the New Haven Line from the Penn Central trustees,
securing complete control of the line to Metro-North.
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Bibliographic Essay
Secondary Sources
Writing my essay about the Metro-North has posed several sourcing challenges but has
also been a highly rewarding research experience. The secondary source base for writing on
twentieth-century U.S. railroads is rich; however, most of these books tend to focus on the
railroad industry on the whole (with an emphasis on freight rail) or, occasionally, on passenger
rail. I have not found a scholarly treatment of commuter railroads in particular and how they
weathered the demise of private passenger railroading in the mid-1900s.
As you will know from reading my essay, the history of the mergers, bankruptcies, and
litigation surrounding the Northeast railroads in the 1960s–80s is extraordinarily complicated,
and several key books have helped me get a grasp on this period. These include Richard
Saunders’s Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900–1970 (2001) and Robert Gallamore and
John Meyer’s American Railroads: Decline and Renaissance in the Twentieth Century (2014).
Saunders’s book gives an extraordinarily detailed window into the characters and issues that
drove the often-fickle politicking that led to the mergers and failures of the 1960s. Both books
provide an excellent overview of railroad regulatory history and help to draw out the longer saga
of various attempts at nationalization and deregulation as the railroads lost their monopolistic
edge in the twentieth century.
To supplement the broader scholarship I mentioned above, I drew on railroad journals for
their detailed treatment of more specific issues. These articles were well-sourced and sought to
shed new light on particular vignettes related to my project. The journal Railroad History has
provided some excellent articles on the specific problems of the New Haven Railroad and an indepth retrospective on the case of Penn Central in Geoffrey Doughty’s “What to Do with the
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New Haven” (Fall–Winter 2013) and Robert Holzweiss’s “Penn Central Reconsidered” (Fall–
Winter 2017), respectively. Another source in this genre, and the only secondary source I could
find that centered Metro-North, is “How Metro-North Did It: From Faltering to First Rate in a
Decade” by William Middleton in a special edition of Passenger Train Journal entitled North
American Commuter Rail 1994. This article provides statistics showing the rapid turnaround the
railroad accomplished in its first ten years of operation, arguing that New York and
Connecticut’s aggressive modernization programs and the total focus on commuters enabled the
railroad to drastically improve service.
Another class of sources that informed my paper were popular histories. These books,
usually replete with railfan photographs and anecdotes, were useful for getting a clearer sense of
the culture surrounding the railroad as well as a sort of insider view of the issues that agitate the
many railfans who cherish the industry and know its ins and outs. Such titles as On the 8:02: An
Informal History of Commuting by Rail in America by Lawrence Grow (1979) and Next Stop
Grand Central: A Trip through Time on New York’s Metropolitan Area Commuter Railroads by
Stan Fischler (1986) gave some excellent vignettes in the history of the New Haven but were
generally frustratingly vague and informal in their sourcing. Conrail (2004), by Timothy Doherty
and Brian Solomon, was a helpful resource for understanding that railroad’s creation and
operational history and made the argument that although the railroad eventually split up, it was a
success. Unfortunately, Conrail did not contain much information on its commuter services (a
perhaps unsurprising if disappointing fact given how marginal they were in comparison to
Conrail’s freight business).
While the source base for commuter rail was quite limited, I found a wide range of
supplementary reading on the history of public transportation, suburban development, and the
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reign of the automobile that helped inform my broader thinking about the project. Sam Bass
Warner’s seminal work on commuting patterns along streetcar lines in Boston, Streetcar
Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900 (1969) helped motivate the project and
explained how radial railroad lines extending from a major metropolis dictated urban and
suburban development. Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail in the
American Century by Stephen Goddard (1996) was an excellent resource for comparing the
favorable treatment given by the government to private automobiles and truckers to the
burdensome regulation and taxation experienced by the railroads (due to legacy antitrust fears).
Autophobia: Love and Hate in the Automobile Era by Brian Ladd (2008) helped provide
international perspective on the U.S.’s comparative disinvestment in public transit in the mid20th century.
Primary Sources
In my project, I have encountered a rich and varied primary source base with some
frustrating gaps. My first discovery was the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
archives at the University of Connecticut Library’s Archives and Special Collections in Storrs.
The library has extensive holdings related to the railroad, including corporate records,
photographs, and ephemera as well as the records of the New Haven Railroad Historical and
Technical Association. These archives include extensive documentation of the railroad’s final
bankruptcy in 1961 and preparation for the merger with the Pennsylvania and New York Central
Railroads in the 1960s. Over the course of three research visits, I consulted these documents with
the help of Laura Smith, a librarian who specializes in UConn’s railroad history collection.
Finding material related to Conrail and Metro-North was much more difficult. I found a
single finding aid for a Metro-North collection held by the New York City Transit museum in
Brooklyn. Unfortunately, this collection contained only a smattering of documents from the first
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ten years or so of Metro-North’s operation, including a handful of annual reports and capital
improvement programs. The most useful items from this collection were ephemera including
several issues of The Commuter, the MTA’s commuter relations pamphlet from the 1970s, and a
1982 flyer by Peter Stangl, Metro-North’s first president, announcing the railroad’s coming
transition as a departure from “poor and uncomfortable” Conrail service. I was also able to find
an incomplete set of MTA annual reports from the 1970s at the Science, Industry, and Business
Library of the New York Public Library.
Beyond these archival visits, I found the remainder of my primary sources online or in
print through the Yale Library and inter-library loans. Many of these sources were judiciary,
Interstate Commerce Commission, and state and congressional documents, which provided a
first-hand look into the federal- and state-level testimony and legislative thinking during these
periods of restructuring for the railroads. I also made extensive use of the New York Times’s
digitized archive to examine newspaper coverage of the experience of commuters on the New
Haven Line as well as factual details on the day-by-day progress of mergers, subsidy
negotiations, and management changeover.
Another set of sources I made use of were a handful of studies conducted by outside
consultants and academics on commuting in the 1960s. These works bridged the gap between
primary and secondary sources because they were used contemporaneously by lawmakers,
judges, and the railroads as scientific support for their agendas, even though they frequently drew
wildly different conclusions. Future Highways and Urban Growth, a 1961 report by New
Haven-based Wilbur Smith and Associates centered the automobile and in the fashion of its time
called for urban freeway construction while admitting the necessity of transit for peak-period
trips. Commuter Transportation: A Study of Passenger Transportation in the New Jersey–New
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York–Connecticut Metropolitan Region with Particular Reference to Railroad Commutation, a
1961 publication prepared by the venerable Regional Plan Association of New York for the
United States Senate, posited the necessity of commuter rail more forcefully. “The Decline of
Railroad Commutation,” a 1962 Business History Review article by influential urban historian
George Hilton imagined car-oriented Los Angeles as the city of the future, showing the wide
range of responses from planners to what was known as the “urban transportation problem”
during the height of the automobile era.
Finally, I conducted oral interviews with four former MTA employees, which helped me
understand many of the issues—both contemporary and past—occupying the minds of the
railroad’s public transit management and gave me a better sense of the arc of the Metro-North’s
now 36 years of service. These were with Lee Sander, MTA executive director from 2007 to
2009, Howard Permut, Metro-North president from 2008 to 2014, Peter Stangl, Metro-North
president from 1983 to 1991 and MTA chairman from 1991 to1995, and Richard Ravitch, MTA
chairman from 1979 to 1983. Permut, Stangl, and Ravitch were part of a small group that built
the Metro-North in the early 1980s. They provided valuable insights on the planning for MetroNorth, the varying level of cooperation between New York and Connecticut in running and
funding the New Haven Line, and Metro-North’s experience renegotiating labor rules with its
unions.
Conclusion
It was a pleasure to compile such a broad source base for this project, although it was at
times overwhelming to try to maintain a comprehensive grasp on such a variegated and
beleaguered history as that of commuting on the New Haven Line, even in just a three-decade
period. The main gap in my sources lies with the MTA; it was difficult to determine why MetroNorth was not created until 1983 (beyond the action of Congress and the Reagan Administration
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to relieve Conrail of its commuter obligations) when service on its lines had been poor for over
two decades and the MTA had run the Long Island Railroad since 1965.
Though the gap in secondary source coverage of the privatization of commuter
railroading in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s was frustrating because I had to piece
together bits of information from many sources, it was satisfying to feel like the work I produced
brought to the foreground an under-sung but vital part of the daily life of American railroading as
it suffered the most major crisis in its history.
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